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Adam Smith is often considered the father of capitalism or a passionate
promoter of free markets. The invisible hand of self-interest generates pros
perity everywhere it is left to work without interference. But then we have

2008. The financial system of the United States seems to break down. All
major European economies struggle to remain above water. Iceland, praised

for its embrace of free markets in the last few decades, goes down . Alan
Greenspan is cited over and over again saying that markets have failed, and
nobody knows why. Adam Smith is wrong!
But is Adam Smith wrong? Or is the caricature of Smith wrong?
In this paper I show that Adam Smith is indeed right, even if his caricature

is not. The reading of Smith that I present here does not make him seem an

optimistic describer of a providential order moved by an always-successful
invisible hand. Rather, I will present some of the more pessimistic analyses of
Smith, which, unfortunately, seem to be most appropriate to describe artd
analyze our current affairs. This reading of Smith may provide an explanation

for the events that started in the fall of 2008. I fear that the pessimism that

one can read in certain parts of Smith may apply to today's situation .

To show how we can look at the financial crisis of today with Smithian

tools, I will focus only on a few relevant stylized facts, without any pretence
of completeness. Homeowners and other borrowers took on loans too big to
be repaid. Accounting frauds generated large profits for some at the expense
of many. Many banks and institutions grew too big to fail. And the attempts
to mitigate the breakdown of the system generated a large amount of public
funds available for grabbing. Smith, in his own time, described this combina
tion of factors which today have weakened the commercial system to a wor
rying degree.
The 'beautiful system of natural liberty' that Smith describes is a system
that may be achieved only under rare circumstances. Smith recognizes sys
tematic biases in human behaviours, ranging from overestimation of prob
ability of success to almost blind admiration for the rich. He recognizes the
dangers of concentrated interests. He recognizes the fundamental role of jus
tice and morality in a well-functioning society, so that laws should serve the
general population, not the interest of a few at the expense of the many.
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Smith makes a few policy recommendations, suggesting that the beautiful
system that results from human actions but not human design would be
threatened otherwise. Dismissing or failing to recognize its potential
weaknesses may lead to it crumbling into ruins.
With this I am not claiming that Smith does not believe that a natural
system of liberty is not possible at all. But simply that its achievement is not to
be taken for granted. Smith does present the idea of a natural system of liberty
which develops with and allows for the further development of economic
growth. This point is well known and does not need to be challenged or
developed further here.In fact, the strength of Smith's claim is notorious.Smith
notices that our nature is not perfect.Perfection is not to be expected for indi
viduals and for institutions.Our bodies are not perfect, and do not need to be
perfect for us to live relatively well.Similarly, our institutions are not perfect
and do not need to be perfect to direct us toward the natural system of liberty.
We are able to achieve an economic system that leads to prcsperity and liberty
even with our imperfect means. This point has recently been made by Tony
Aspromourgos (2009: 245), who claims that 'Smith expresses here a conviction
that even under second-best (or worse) constitutions, regimes, and policies,
"nature" is still in play, working away for the good'. Smith indeed tells us that:
Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the
human body could be preserved only by a certain precise regimen of diet
and exercise, of which every, the smallest, violation necessarily occasioned
some degree of disease or disorder proportioned to the degree of the
violation. Experience, however, would seem to show that the human body
frequently preserves, to all appearance at least, the most perfect state of
health under a vast variety of different regimens; even under some which
are generally believed to be very far from being perfectly wholesome. But
the healthful state of the human body, it would seem, contains in itself
some unknown principle of preservation, capable either of preventing or
of correcting, in many respects, the bad effects even of a very faulty regi
men. Mr. Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very speculative
physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same kind concern
ing the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive and
prosper only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect
liberty and perfect justice.He seems not to have considered that in the
political body, the natural effort which every man is continually making
to better his own condition, is a principle of preservation capable of pre
venting and correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political
economy, in some degree, both partial and oppressive. Such a political
economy, though it no doubt retards more or less, is not always capable
of stopping altogether the natural progress of a nation towards wealth
and prosperity, and still less of making it go backwards. If a nation could
not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice,
there is not in the world a nation which could ever have prospered. In the
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political body, however, the wisdom of nature has fortunately made
ample provision for remedying many of the bad effects of the folly and
injustice of man; in the same manner as it has done in the natural body,
for remedying those of his sloth and intemperance.
(WN IV.ix.28)
The parallels between our natural body and the living body of society are
frequent.But they are not always as upbeat.Our body can get sick.And bad
policies can make a social and economic body sick. They can even kill it.
The whole system of her industry and commerce has thereby been ren
dered less secure [by the monopoly of the colony trade]; the whole state
of her body politick less healthful, than it otherwise would have been.In
her present condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome
bodies in which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon
that account, are liable to many dangerous disorders scarce incident to
those in which all the parts are more properly proportioned. A small stop
in that great blood-vessel, which has been artificially swelled beyond its
natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural proportion of the
industry and commerce of the country has been forced to circulate, is
very likely to bring on the most dangerous disorders upon the whole body
politick.The expectation of a rupture with the colonies, accordingly, has
struck the people of Great Britain with more terror than they eyer felt for
a Spanish armada, or a French invasion .. .. The blood, of whicH the
circulation is stopt in some of the smaller vessels, easily disgorges itself
into the greater, without occasioning any dangerous disorder; but, when it
is stopt in any of the greater vessels, convulsions, apoplexy, or death, are
the immediate and unavoidable consequences.
(WN IV.vii.c.43)
Smith seems, therefore, to be both optimistic and pessimistic about the power
of nature to generate and sustain a healthy natural system of liberty. On the
one hand, nature seems to be powerful enough to allow us to achieve it,
however imperfectly.On the other hand, there is nothing that can guarantee
the emergence or sustainment of an economic system that generates and
maintains prosperity and freedom.History indeed seems to show how rare
that emergence is and how difficult its maintenance is.It may not be an
accident that Smith was over-pessimistic regarding the possibility of elim
inating restrictions from the inland trade in Britain and about the voluntary
emancipation of slavery.It turned out that he was wrong, but, nevertheless,
he
'
had little reason to be otherwise.
The tendency toward the development of an order of natural liberty, for
Smith, is not necessarily linear, or necessary at all.Human history is con
voluted and its path zigzags. The natural system of liberty interacts with
accidents of history, as well as all of our natural yet at times destructive
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human passions. Pratap Bhanu Mehta (2006: 255) may be right when he
states that
The bulk of The Wealth of Nations is devoted to the thought that for
much of their history human beings have not acted on their interests; at
least, they have set up systems of regulation and restraints such that only
the interests of a few were served. Most important . . . the interests of
humans are in conflict. For Smith, there is in a sense, nothing natural
about the 'system of natural liberty'. If mankind had by degrees,
unevenly and uncertainly, emerged from tutelage, it was less of a testa
ment to the power of interest than to unanticipated consequences of
actions or to fortuitous combinations of interests.
Smith indeed points out that the system of natural liberty in a sense is not
that natural. That is, that what is natural is not the norm. For example, in the
introductory chapter of Book III of the Wealth of Nations, titled 'Of the
Natural Progress of Opulence', Smith explains the 'natural order of things'
that brings the progress of opulence to different countries. 'The cultivation
and improvement of the country, therefore which affords subsistence, must
necessarily, be prior to the increase of the towns, which furnishes only the
means of conveniency and luxury' (WN III.i.2): exactly the opposite of what
he illustrates in chapter 4, 'How the Commerce of the Towns Contributed to
the Improvement in the Country'. In fact, three of the four chapters of Book
III tell the story of how the natural order of things was inverted! Smith
explicitly warns his readers of this inversion of the natural course of things at
the end of the first chapter: 'But though this natural order of things must have
taken place in some degree in every society, it has, in all modem states of
Europe, been, in many respects, entirely inverted' (WN III.i.9).
Joseph Cropsey (2001 [1957]: 73) describes this idea in the following way:
there is nothing in the nature of things which will or might 'inevitably'
lead to the coming into being of the natural or the most expedient social
arrangement, indeed since history is not the rational expression of nature
but in principle may conflict with nature, there arises the need for a
statement of the strictly natural, which of course is the substance of the
Wealth of Nations, a book that delivers the truth about nature.
It is possible therefore to read current events as being in conflict with and
threatening the development of the natural system of liberty that Smith
describes.
The paper develops as follow. In the next section I present the problem in
the loan markets generated by what Smith would have described as our sys
tematic overestimation of the probability of success. The analysis of the
motivations that lead us to big commercial frauds follows. The third section
describes how Smith envisions a stable decentralized banking system, a vision
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that is absent today. The fourth section describes the major threat for
Smith's time and ours, the power of lobbies. A section on the solutions
that Smith proposes, which unfortunately are weak, is followed by some
conclusions.
·

Overestimation of the probability of success
Today's financial crisis is often attributed to excess lending. Adam Smith, too,
worried about problems in lending markets. For Smith, a properly functioning
lending market has to take into account some characteristics of human
behaviour. Smith worried that if lending practices are based on an assumption
of human behaviour that is different from actual behaviour, lending markets
will not function properly and will therefore cause a misallocation and/or
destruction of resources rather an increase in them. The problem described by
Smith is unfortunately, in part, what we experience today.
For Adam Smith, human beings are systematically biased. In particular,
any man in reasonable health would overestimate his probability of success. It
is 'the presumptuous hope of success [that] seems to act here as upon all other
occasions' (WN I.x.b.33) that causes miscalculation of the probability of suc
cess. A man thinks others may fail, but not him. He will therefore over
estimate the probability of his success and underestimate the probability of his
failure.
The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men, have of their
own abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and mor
alists of all ages. Their absurd presumption in their own good fortune, has
been less taken notice of. It is, however, if possible, still more universal.
There is no man living who, when in tolerable health and spirits, has not
some share of it. The chance of gain is by every man more or less over
valued, and the chance of loss is by most men under-valued, and by
scarce any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, valued more than it
is worth.
(WN l.x.b.26)
This implies that any project that has a probability of failure that is more than
zero would be incorrectly seen as a potential success in the eyes of its pro
poser. Smith explains the 'irrational' decision of going into certain high-risk
professions in terms of this systematic overestimation of success. For example,
people who decide to get into smuggling are attracted by the high rate of
profits of the successful smugglers and underestimate the very high rate of
failure of this profession. They seem to think that the high probability of
failure applies to others, not to themselves (WN l.x.b.33). Similarly, gamblers
persist in their failures because they systematically overestimate their good
luck. Lotteries are, for Smith, a basically sure form of revenue for the state
(WN l.x.b.27) exactly because of this reason. Markets where risk is involved,
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such as the lending market, are markets that have to deal with this systematic
perception bias (Bentham 1 952 [1 787]).
I do not think it is accidental that Smith proposes regulation in the lending
market (Paganelli 2003). If a borrower systematically overestimates his prob
ability of success and he is wrongly convinced he will be able to repay his
debt, the lending market may have a problem: too many loans that will not be
repaid may be given out. This is particularly true when the lender is lending
out someone else's money. And if we add a potential reward for each loan
given out, and a lack of punishment in case of failure to get the loan repaid,
the problem of moral hazard not only emerges but lacks any obvious remedy.
For Adam Smith, an economic system that disregards, or even worse pro
motes, the systematic perception bias of our probability of success is a system
that can neither prosper nor last.

Overweight on wealth
The second problem we hear blamed for today's crisis seems to be financial
fraud. Ponzi schemes, insider trading, creative accounting, or questionable
practices are so often in the news that it seems that the success of markets is
just an illusion. Smith, again, warns us against fraudulent practices because
they may undermine the system of natural liberty of which he is so fond.
Smith believes that mankind is driven, among other things, by the desire to
receive the approbation of others. We receive approbation in two ways: by
behaving morally and by parading wealth. Wealth glitters while virtue is
modest. That is to say that wealth is easily recognizable, while virtue is not.
An increase in wealth, like an increase in virtue, generates approbation. A
decrease in wealth, like a decrease in virtue, generates disapprobation. But
because we can easily see the wealth, and we can recognize virtues only with
difficulty, a large increase in wealth would generate more approbation than
the approbation lost due to the immoral means used to generate that wealth
(Paganelli 2009). Smith indeed tells us:
We frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly
directed towards the rich and the great, than towards the wise and vir
tuous. We see frequently the vices and follies of the powerful much less
despised than the poverty and weakness of the innocent. ... Two different
roads are presented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this so
much desired object [respect and admiration of mankind]; the one, by the
study of wisdom and the practice of virtue; the other, by the acquisition
of wealth and greatness. Two different characters are presented to our
emulation; the one, of proud ambition and ostentatious avidity; the other,
of humble modesty and equitable justice. Two different models, two dif
ferent pictures, are held out to us, according to which we may fashion our
own character and behaviour; the one more gaudy and glittering in its
colouring; the other more correct and more exquisitely beautiful in its
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outline: the one forcing itself upon the notice of every wandering eye; the
other, attracting the attention of scarce any body but the most studious
and careful observer. ... The great mob of mankind are the admirers and
worshippers, and, what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently
the disinterested admirers and worshippers, of wealth and greatness.
(TMS I.iii.3.2)
ln Part VI of TMS, Smith repeats the same claim: the great mob of mankind

more fascinated by the greatness of the rich than by the wise and virtuous,
because the glitter of wealth is more visible and more easily recognizable.

[Our] fascination of greatness ... is so powerful, that the rich and the
great are too often preferred to the wise and the virtuous. . . . The undis
tinguishing eye of the great mob of mankind can well enough perceive
the [plain and palpable difference of birth and fortune]: it is with difficulty
that the nice discernment of the wise and the virtuous can sometimes
distinguish the [invisible and often uncertain difference of wisdom and
virtue].
(TMS VI.ii.l .20)
'the same principle' that makes 'the great mob of mankind ... look
... with a wondering ... and foolish admiration' at 'wealth and greatness'
us admire the success of great conquerors. We do not distinguish
'such splendid characters as those of a Caeser or an Alexande� ...
that of the most brutal and savage barbarians, of an Attila, a Gengis, or
Tamerlane' because they are all successful (TMS VI.iii.30).
So Smith gives a description of the incentives to commit large financial
: the gains in approbation from the increase in wealth are more than
losses generated by the decrease in virtue. In TMS I.iii.3, a chapter titled
the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this dis
to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect the per
of poor and mean condition' , and written after the completion of the
of Nations, Smith tells us that
The candidates for fortune too frequently abandon the paths of virtues ...
They often endeavour, therefore, not only by fraud and falsehood, the
ordinary and vulgar arts of intrigue and cabal; but sometimes by the
perpetration of the most enormous crimes, by murder and by assassina
tion, by rebellion and civil war, to supplant and destroy those who
oppose or stand in the way of their greatness.
(TMS I.iii.3.8)
We have a plausible explanation for why financial scandals are in the bil
of dollars rather than just in the hundreds. Smith seems to indicate that
kind of behaviour is more observable where there are large 'profit'
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opportunities. A poor society does not have the opportunity to generate as

And the bank, losing profits, would decrease the amount of issuing (WN II.

when we have a large economic expansion, probably starting from a real

over-issue, as it may bring all into bankruptcy.

gain. Everybody is making millions. Why aren't you?

reason for over-issuing, besides the problems just mentioned, says Smith, is

many incidents like these, simply because there is not much to possess. But
change such as the IT revolution, we have large opportunities for monetary

ii.49-51). The implication is that neither merchants nor banks should

But this does not prevent banks from over-issuing (WN II.ii.41-87). One

If we take Smith's argument seriously, is our economic situation sustain

the bank's ignorance - banks do not always understand what they are doing

receive the approbation of others, even if that implies doing the wrong

that 'every particular banking company has not always understood or atten

able? Are laws and regulations really enough to constrain our innate desire to

thing? Are stricter laws really going to prevent another Madoff from arising if

and what is best for them (WN II.ii.53). Indeed Smith tells us more than once

ded to its own particular interest, and the circulation has frequently been

the opportunity for material gains is so large? Or does our wealthy system

overstocked with paper-money' (WN II.ii.56).

in institutions and in the system itself will eventually crumble, as many

projectors fool banks when traders draw and redraw upon one another. If

contain the seeds of its destruction, since trust in other individuals as well as
accusations we hear today seem to indicate?

Overconcentration of banking
A third factor that seems to have challenged the stability of the system before

Smith explains that banks may not understand what they are doing because

they do it from the same banks, the bank may realize what is going on. But
traders use different banks, and might add more projectors to the circle. Dis

tinguishing between a 'real bill of exchange' and a 'fictitious' one becomes
more difficult. And when a banker realizes he is discounting 'fictitious bills', it

is too late (WN II.ii.72). Additionally, banks, like everybody else, tend to

the fall of 2008 is the presence of banks and financial institutions that are too

overestimate their probability of success and underestimate their probability

we read the opposite of what we observe today. For Smith, a successful

their outflow (WN II.ii.76). This, again, is not a story unique to the

big to fail. When we read what Smith considers a successful banking system,

banking and financial system is a system composed of many small banks
rather than few large banks. Smith's rationale is the following.

Banks may be short-sighted and may have the tendency to over-issue

credit to try to increase their profits (WN II.ii.43). So not only are creditors,

because of their overestimation of the probability of their success, tempted to

ask for over-issuing of credit, as we saw above, but banks are also tempted to

of failure. They tend to overestimate the inflow of money and underestimate
eighteenth century ....

Smith seems to maintain an optimistic attitude as long as there are many

small competing banks, as competitive markets are generally good teachers

(Cowen and Kroszner 1994; White 1995). Many small competing banks should
be able to constrain the tendency to over-issue because if depositors fear over

issuing, they can withdraw their deposits and bring them to more prudent

over-issue credit.

banks. Additionally, and most importantly, the advantage of competing banks

profits. When they do, they attract merchants' attention. Merchants ask for

behaviour was indeed imprudent, the effects will be limited. The consequences

chants enter these markets, profits are eaten away (over-trading) and with

consequences of the failure of a big bank (Paganelli 2006).

In addition, Smith tells us that certain commercial activities may have high

money to participate in these profitable trades. But as more and more mer

them the resources to pay the banks back (over-issuing). When wise banks

reject a credit extension, traders use 'shift of drawing and redrawing' to raise

the money used to over-trade (WN II.ii.65). That is to say, 'over-trading of

is that they are many and small. This means that if one of them fails because its
of the failure of a small bank will be small, unlike the potentially catastrophic

The late multiplication of banking companies in both parts of the United

Kingdom, an event by which many people have been much alarmed,

some bold projectors . . . was the original cause of . . . excessive circulation of

instead of diminishing, increases the security of the publick. It obliges all

have read in the newspapers in the past few years.

their currency beyond its due proportion to their cash, to guard them

paper money' (WN II.ii.57). This story is not that different from what we

of them to be more circumspect in their conduct, and, by not extending

Over-issuing of credit for Smith is dangerous. Banks have to be ready to

selves against those malicious runs, which the rivalship of so many com

ready. And if they signal hesitation or difficulties, they might generate bank

each particular company within a narrower circle, and reduces their cir

its promises, it faces an outflow of funds larger than its inflow. The acquisition

a greater number of parts, the failure of any one company, an accident

fulfil their obligation at all times. But if they over-issue, they might not be as

runs (WN II.ii.48). F urthermore, if a bank that has over-issued tries to fulfil

of reserves to fulfil its demand might quickly become very expensive. It is

therefore in the bank's interest not to over-issue, because, to keep its coffers

ready, it would have to spend what it would gain, if not more, by over-issuing.

petitors is always ready to bring upon them. It restrains the circulation of

culating notes to a smaller number. By dividing the whole circulation into
which, in the course of things, must sometimes happen, becomes of less

consequence to the publick.

(WN II.ii . l 06)
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So a bank should fail, if it behaved imprudently. The bankruptcy of a bank is
a very powerful lesson to its banker and to other banks. By allowing a bank
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lobbies, degenerates. The government grants favours to organized ipterests at
the expense of the rest of society, causing the most severe injustices:

to fail, the market teaches its participants what should be done and
what should not be done. Once banks understand what they have 'not

The cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture to affirm, are mild and

always understood', they will not over-issue. And because every man is driven

gentle, in comparison of some of those which the clamour of our mer

by his desire to better his condition, there is no reason to believe that

chants and manufacturers has extorted from the legislature, for the sup

banks will forever 'not attended to [their ] own particular interest' (Skaggs

port of their own absurd and oppressive monopolies. Like the laws of

1999). Unfortunately, this face of the market does not seem to be allowed to

Draco, these laws may be said to be all written in blood.
(WN IV. viii.l 7)

show itself today. If we are not learning from our mistakes, can we ever learn
at all?
Perhaps even if there is a possibility of learning from our mistakes, David

Smith indeed accuses big merchants and manufacturers of conspiring against
the public, explaining that they are 'an order of men whose interest is never

Hume ( 1985 [ 1752]: 363) was correct when he claimed:

exactly the same with the public, who generally have an interest to deceive
So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that, notwithstanding such

and even oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occa

a violent shock to public credit, as a voluntary bankruptcy in ENG

sions, both deceived and oppressed it' (WN, I.xi.lO).

LAND would occasion, it would not be long ere credit would again

The virulent dangers of lobbying are many, such as, but not limited to,

revive in as flourishing a condition as before. ... And though men are

those in WN IV.i.lO: IV.ii.38; and IV.iii.c.lO (Stigler 1971; E vensky 2005). An

commonly more governed by what they have seen, than by what they

additional source of worry for Smith is that lobbies are able to convince

,

foresee, with whatever certainty; yet promises, protestations, fair appear

others that special organized groups are not enemies of society but defenders

ances, with the allurement of present interest, have such powerful influ

and promoters of the wealth of the country (e.g. WN IV.iii.c.13).

ence as few are able to resist. Mankind are, in all ages, caught by

The cupidity of interest groups springs and grows the more wealth there is

the same baits: the same tricks, played over and over again, still trepan

to grab through the protection of the government. And unfortunately this is
what seems to be the case today, with the stimulus money. We have an

them.

undreamt of silln of money available for those who lobby the most. '

Lobbying

Solutions?

Another factor that Smith sees as fundamental for the sustaining of a system
of natural liberty is a functioning system of justice. This, for Smith, implies
that the laws that are passed are laws that favour the majority of the people,
not just a small group. If that is not the case, the system of justice becomes a
system of monstrous injustice, poisoning the beautiful system of natural lib
erty.
We are indeed told in TMS that 'Sometimes the interest of particular orders
of men who tyrannize the government, warp the positive law of the country
from what natural justice would prescribe' (TMS V II. iv.36), and in WN that
To hurt in any degree the interest of any one order of citizens, for no
other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to
that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the
different orders of his subjects.
(WN IY. viii.30)

Is there hope, then? Or is the Western-style economic system as we know it
about to become a part of history? Smith, in attempting to address the pro
blems of his day, appeals to both the self-organizing forces of markets as well
as to the feeble public spirit of the legislator. But if markets are suffocated by
regulations, and if hell is indeed paved with good intentions, we are left with
little hope to hold onto.
Commerce itself seems to be able to generate some remedies (WN IV. vii.
c.4 7-54. See also Rosenberg

1990), as does our weak civic spirit (TMS

IV.l .l l ). The legislator should not fall for the flattery of the lobbyists but
should preserve the system of natural liberty out of reverence toward its
beauty. Unfortunately, this seems to be just a dream.
The glimmers of wealth presented by organized interest groups seem to
overwhelm political leaders, like everybody else.
The external graces, the frivolous accomplishments of that impertinent

But, unfortunately this is exactly what some great merchants and manu

and foolish thing called a man of fashion, are commonly more admired

facturers

by

than the solid and masculine virtues of a warrior, a statesman, a philo

government-granted monopolies. A system of justice, when taken over by

sopher, or a legislator. All the great and awful virtues, all the virtues

do

when

there

are

large

profit

opportunities

generated
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which can fit, either for the council, the senate, of the field, are, by the

insolent and insignificant flatterers, who commonly figure the most in

such corrupted societies, held in the utmost contempt and derision.

(TMS I.iii.3.6)

Even if commerce seems to provide large enough benefits to compensate for
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It may very well be that, as Mehta (2006: 257) claims,
Establishing the 'system of natural liberty' under which every man is 'left
perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way' is thus for Smith a

task, rather than something that comes naturally (WN IV.ix.51). The

paradox is that the very motive, self-interest, that allows that system

its downsides, the damages of rent-seeking are going to last. Once privileges

to produce the beneficial consequences it does, constantly threatens to

'formidable' powers merchants and manufacturers have 'intimidate the legis

demand monopolies and privileges that harm society; yet, those very

To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely

of all might be harmonized, not a claim that they are always, or

are granted, they will not be taken away. Indeed Smith is convinced that the
lature' (IV.ii.43) so much that

restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or

Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the

undermine it. It is the pursuit of their interests that leads merchants to

same interests can, under the right institutional conditions, produce ben

eficial outcomes. The Wealth of Nations is an account of how the interests

naturally, in harmony.

publick, but what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of
many individuals, irresistibly oppose it.

(WN

IV.ii.43)

The damage great merchants and manufacturers inflict upon society is

permanent (Tullock 1975).

That the system of natural liberty so much wished for is not the norm is

confirmed by the different levels of growth that we observed. Smith tells us

indeed that an economy that has been in an expansionary state may not be
expansionary forever. It may become sedentary or even recede. North

America, in Smith's time, was an example of an expansionary economy,

China of a sedentary one, and Bengal of a declining one. The reason for

these differences is, for Smith, based both on accidents of history and,

especially, on differences in the quality of the government. When the gov
ernment falls into the hands of interest groups an economy may very well
decline:

Smith describes the beauty of a natural system of liberty, which later

often been associated, correctly or not, with capitalism. This beautiful

of natural liberty is robust under certain conditions but fragile under

conditions, as Smith recognizes. It is robust in the sense that as a system

emerged spontaneously over centuries, it enjoys the strengths of a system

is not limited by the design of human reason. On the other hand, it is
to shocks as a result of human hubris. The belief that we are better

everybody else, either because of our presumptuous hope of �uccess or
of our vain parade of wealth, may lead us to disregard some struc

foundations of the system of natural liberty, undermining it. Combining

systematic perception biases with perverse incentives that motivate us to
the precepts of justice and favour ourselves at the expense of others

society may cause structural cracks to an otherwise solid system. Excess
·

excess lending, excess concentration in the banking industry,

lobbying,

The difference between the genius of the British constitution which pro
tects and governs North America, and that of the mercantile company

and excess fraudulent activities are all worries that
Smith had for his time. And the same worries may apply to our time as

which oppresses and domineers in the East Indias, cannot perhaps

better illustrated than by the different state of those countries.

(WN

I.

All major forms of civilization eventually perished, either deliberately
human hands or inadvertently as a side effect of other events. If the
system and the temporal power of the church have been brought down by
silent revolution of commerce and the childish vanity of the nobles and
high clergy, why can't the capitalist system be brought down by the
attacks of lobbies and the vanity of those who claim to have perfect
edge of human rationality and to be able to control the economy and

the 'mistakes' of the market?
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